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Abstract:  Observers routinely claim that the Japanese government during the 
high-growth 1960s and 70s rationed and ultimately directed credit.  It banned investments 
by foreigners, barred domestic competitors to banks, and capped loan interest rates.   
Through the resulting credit shortage, it manipulated credit to promote its industrial 
policy. 
In fact, the government did nothing of the sort.  It did not bar foreign capital, did 
not block domestic rivals, and did not set maximum interest rates that bound.  Using 
evidence on loans to all 1000-odd firms listed on Section 1 of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
from 1968 to 1982, we show that the observed interest rates reflected borrower risk and 
mortgageable assets, and that banks did not use low-interest deposits to circumvent any 
interest caps.  Instead, the loan market probably cleared at the nominal rates. 
We follow our empirical inquiry with a case study of one of the industies where 
the government tried hardest to direct credit:  ocean shipping.  We find no evidence of 
credit rationing.  Rather, we show that non-conformist firms funded their projects readily 
outside authorized avenues -- so readily that the non-conformists grew with spectacular 
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"There is no question," writes Krugman (1994: 142), "that before the early 1970s 
the Japanese system was heavily directed from the top, with the MITI [i.e., the Ministry 
of International Trade & Industry] and the Ministry of Finance [i.e., the MOF] 
influencing the allocation of credit and foreign exchange in an effort to push the economy 
where they liked."   
No question, indeed.  By standard economic theory, Krugman's Japanese 
government (and in truth, it is not his Japanese government, for he accurately reflects the 
secondary literature) would have accomplished a spectacular feat.  Throughout the world, 
governments have shown themselves congenitally unable to ration gasoline, electricity, 
medicines -- even rice.   
Yet by Krugman's account, the Japanese government rationed money with ease.  
Durable, invisible, fungible by definition, traded in the most fluid of markets, available 
from anyone with assets of value, and arbritrable on a moment's notice -- because money 
is all this and more, it should be the hardest asset of all to ration.  Notwithstanding, if the 
standard accounts be true, the Japanese government isolated the economy from foreign 
funds, suppressed competitors to bank loans, kept interest rates low, and manipulated the 
resulting credit shortage to route capital as it pleased.  Contradicting the most basic 
lesson of the communist disaster, it embodied a dream-come-true for regulatorily inclined 
intellectuals. 
  A dream it was, for the Japanese government managed nothing of the sort.   
Despite the massive secondary literature detailing the dream as if it were true, the 
Japanese government did not isolate the market from foreign investment.  It did not block 
firms from raising funds through the stock market, through trade credit, or even through 
the bond market.  It did not keep nominal interest rates at sub-market levels.  It did not 
create a capital shortage, it did not stop arbitrage, it did not ration credit, and it had 
virtually no say in who invested how much in what.  The Japan of the high-growth 1960s 
and 70s was not a world of directed credit.  It was a world where firms raised their funds 
through decentralized, competitive capital markets. 
  We begin by surveying the literature on which Krugman and others rely (Section 
I).  We then explain the contours of the actual -- not mythic -- regulatory structure 
(Section II).  Using data on all firms listed on Section 1 of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
(TSE; the largest firms), we estimate the supply function for bank loans.  We explore the 
determinants of both interest rates and deposit balances (Section III).  Finally, we use the 
ocean shipping industry to illustrate how the regulations did not bind (Section IV).   
 
I.  Tales of Japanese Finance 
A.  Introduction: 
Krugman accurately captures the secondary literature on Japan.  Granted, most 
economically sophisticated scholars have jettisoned the notion that omniscient and 
omnipotent bureaucrats masterminded the high-growth in 1960s and 70s Japan.  Yet even 
they retain the idea that bureaucrats controlled the allocation of credit.  The foreign Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 3 
exchange controls, bond market restrictions, and interest rate ceilings collectively led to 
rationing, they reason.  Within that rationed environment, bureaucrats determined which 
firms borrowed and which went without. 
 
B.  The Structure of the Controls: 
  1.  The tale. -- Lincoln, Gerlach & Ahmadjian (1998: 324) put the standard 
account most straightforwardly:  
Japanese corporations have been extraordinarily dependent on bank debt as a 
vehicle for financing investment.  This level of concentration in financing sources 
coupled with the extrememly rapid growth of the Japanese economy put enormous 
pressure on Japanese banks ....  The precarious position of the banks rendered them, 
in turn, highly dependent on borrowing from the Bank of Japan.  The Bank of Japan 
and the Ministry of Finance were able to leverage this dependence into a high 
degree of control over the financial sector .... 
In his NBER study, Meerschwam (1991: 206) echoes the tale:   
[T]he Japanese financial system, by alllowing a complex form of rationed capital 
allocation within the context of steering and guidance by authorities ..., provided 
the beneficiaries of the preferential funds [the ability] to embark on growth 
strategies without having to rely, to a large extent, on impersonal capital markets. 
According to Cargill (2000: 39): 
[The] financial system was an instrument of industrial policy maintained and 
protected by mutual support, restraints on competition, and insularity between the 
domestic financial sector, the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan, and 
politicians. 
These players "assumed a specific set of objectives," he explains (id.), like 
"reindustrialization" and "export-led economic growth."  They then accomplished the 
objectives through "a rigidly regulated and administratively controlled financial system." 
 
  2.  Foreign exchange. -- Traditionally, observers give several reasons why the 
government could wield so heavy a hand.  First, using its control over foreign exchange, 
it isolated the Japanese financial market from international competition.  Throughout the 
1960s, explain Ito & Kiyono (1988: 166-67), the Japanese government exercised "strict 
control" over foreign direct investment.   
Indeed, the regulations themselves did seem labyrinthian in the extreme (Smith, 
1984).  As Cargill (2000: 40) again puts it, "[f]oreign financial institutions were 
prohibited or restricted to limited participation in the financial system."  Legal scholar 
Henderson (1986: 132) argues that the Japanese foreign exchange controls helped: 
exclude and restrict foreign banking and to shield from international market forces 
Japan's high savings managed by a controlled banking system, fixed interest rates, 
and preferential credit allocations (discriminating against small producers and 
consumers) essential to the large export firms. 
In sum, concludes Calder (1993: 35), the exchange controls "gave Japan the crucial 
freedom to determine its interest rates in isolation from the rest of the world." 
 
  2.  Domestic limits. -- Second, the government effectively banned most domestic 
alternatives to bank loans.  According to Weinstein & Yafeh (1998: 636), "capital Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 4 
markets in Japan were highly regulated and immature."  Similarly, Calder (1993: 137) 
asserts that "[s]ecurities markets were not well developed and issuing conditions ... were 
onerous."  Conclude Weinstein & Yafeh (1998: 636), "[f]irms could raise only limited 
amounts of capital through commercial flotation of debt or equity." 
Corporations simply "did not have alternative sources of funding until the mid 
1970s," explains Ito (1992: 119).  "[T]he domestic securities market was underdeveloped, 
and loans from abroad were not allowed."  Consequently, "Japan's financial system was 
one of the most regulated and administratively controlled in the world" (Ito, 2000: 95-
96).  Declare Hoshi & Kashyap (2001: 310) flatly:  banks "were the only game in town."
1   
 
  3.  Interest rates. -- Last, the government suppressed interest rates at artificially 
low levels.  We return to these rates immediately below, but Patrick (1972: 114) reflects 
the consensus when he asserts that the "interest rate structure [was] extremely inflexible," 
and that the rates were "set below that which would have resulted solely if market forces 
had been relied upon to determine them."  “It was,” he more recently (2001) explained, 
“a situation of credit rationing.”  As Hamada & Horiuchi (1987: 236) put it:   
The regulation of interest rates has been very comprehensive during the past three 
decades in Japan.  ... [A]t least on the surface, most interest rates in Japan have 
been rigidly regulated, and price mechanisms do not appear to have been effective 
in financial markets.   
 
 
C.  “Compensating Deposits”: 
  1.  Introduction. -- Although most observers agree about the above, a few argue 
that banks and firms partially circumvented the loan interest ceiling.  Some banks 
sometimes, they explain, required borrowers to take more than they needed and deposit 
the "compensating balance" in a low-interest-bearing account at the bank.  Through the 
ploy, they raised the effective interest rate on the loan.   
If so, the credit allocation debate turns on the effect of the balances.  Did the 
banks indeed use them to raise artificially low rates closer to market levels?  Or did they 
merely use the balances -- like banks in other countries -- to lower risk by monitoring 
cash flow patterns at the firm?  
 
2.  The debate. -- On the one hand, Hamada & Horiuchi (1987: 236-37) claim that 
such balances "raised the effective interest rates on bank loans to a level much higher 
than the regulated nominal rates."  In his recent text, Flath (2000: 274) similarly 
concludes that although "the interest rates on bank loans [were] nominally suppressed," 
they "were effectively raised toward market-clearing levels by the device of 
compensating balances."   
  Yet most scholars assert that at least residual capital rationing remained.  In one 
of the first studies in English on point, Patrick (1972: 116) reasons that "[c]ompensatory 
deposit ratios probably do not increase effective interest costs sufficiently to restrict 
                     
1 Similarly, Cargill & Yoshino (2000: 214) write that "corporations had no alternatives in the form 
of domestic money and capital markets or external markets."  Pempel (1978: 152) claims that "the virtual 
absence of a private capital market" made the Bank of Japan "the single tap through which virtually the 
entire Japanese monitary and credit supply must flow." Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 5 
demand to the level of supply.  Since the price mechanism does not clear most financial 
markets, the system relies extensively on credit rationing ...."
2   More recently, Ueda 
(1994) reaches similar results:  Although “the practice of requiring compensating 
deposits on loans made the effective interest rate more variable than the official rate, … 
the effective interest rate [remained] below market clearing levels in the business loan 
market."
3   
 
3.  Rationing. -- Whether the government could allocate credit depends crucially 
on whether the credit market cleared.  If interest rates (either formally or effectively 
through compensating balances) remained at market levels, anything the government did 
to shift funds would simply have produced offsetting shifts elsewhere.  Because the 
marginal cost of funds would have stayed at market levels, even loan subsidies would not 
have affected investment patterns.  "Industrial policy" would have remained hollow to the 
core (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2001b). 
Those observers who argue that the interest rates stayed below market-clearing 
levels usually claim that only firms favored by the government could raise funds.   
According to Pempel (1978: 153), for example, "credit for firms [was available] only in 
accordance with broader policies of the Bank of Japan and the government."  Likewise, 
asserts Cargill (2000: 40), "[g]overnment credit allocation policies ... played a major role 
in allocating funds through intermediation markets."
4   
In this world, the large firms were the favored firms.  As Meerschwam (1991: 199) 
puts it, "the authorities [used their] influence to steer the system through a rationed 
capital market that favored established corporations."  By Milgrom & Roberts' (1994: 25) 
account, "Japan's high national savings rates combined with government restrictions and 
regulations on financial institutions and financial markets combined to give large, 
established Japanese firms a lower cost of capital ...." 
The role that the keiretsu corporate groups allegedly played is more mixed.  On the 
one hand, some scholars argue that members could raise funds preferentially.  As 
Nakatani (1988) reasons, "[g]roup financing ... often played a central role" in ensuring 
that firms had "a stable supply of capital to execute its investment plans."  On the other, 
scholars also claim that the keiretsu preference came at a high price.  The powerful 
banks, they explain, used their control to extract rents.  The more a firm depended on a 
                     
2 In their early work, Ackley & Ishi (1976: 205) thought the point "obvious":  “Obviously, the use 
of rationing instead of price during periods of restriction -- which has been in effect during about 40 
percent of the time over the past twenty years -- means that the average rate of interest could be kept 
considerably lower than it would otherwise have been.”  Proceeding along the same line, Wallich & 
Wallich (1976: 251) claimed that "[d]iscrimination among lenders and among borrowers, rationing, and 
subsidies have been the rule." 
3 After surveying the literature, Cargill & Yoshino (2000: 209-10) likewise determine that the 
government's "objectives were achieved by rigid regulation and administrative control; market forces 
played only a small role." 
4 See also Meerschwam (1991: 205) (firms who wished to borrow "had to force a consistency 
between their own goals and those of the authorities"); Ito (1992: 114) ("During the 1950s and the 1960s, 
the Japanese financial markets were heavily regulated and isolated from the world financial market.  ... The 
monetary authorities explicitly or implicitly fixed most interest rates at low levels.  Lending from banks 
was often rationed.  Consumers and small businesses often had difficulties obtaining mortgages and 
business loans.") Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 6 
bank, the more vulnerable it was, and keiretsu firms were (the argument runs) nothing if 
not dependent.  Rather than favor their group firms, the banks exploited them.  Caves & 
Uekusa (1976) were the first to make the point, but others -- most prominently Weinstein 
& Yafeh (1998) -- soon followed.  
 
II.  Regulation in the Loan Market: 
A.  The Overseas Capital Market: 
  Throughout the 1950s and 60s, the government did “regulate” foreign investment 
in Japan.  It banned it in principle, but subjected the ban to various exceptions.  The 
question is how broadly it allowed the exceptions.  After all, rich foreigners were not 
fighting to park their money in Japan after the war.  Within that world, the Japanese 
government sought less to limit than to encourage foreign investment (Tsusho, 1990: 
398). 
  From 1952 to 1960, foreign firms invested $1.01 billion.  Of that amount, they 
invested 16 percent as equity and 84 percent as debt.  Of the debt, the World Bank loaned 
43 percent (the largest amount to electrical utility firms) and the Washington-based 
EXIM Bank 21 percent.  Of the remaining private-sector (i.e., not World or EXIM 
Banks) loans, 33 percent went to petroleum, 25 to shipping, 18 to electrical utility, 11 to 
metals, and 6 percent to chemical firms (Tsusho, 1990: 402-10). 
  By the 1960s, foreigners poured money into Japan at rates that swamped the 
earlier levels.  In 1961 alone they invested $581 million, in 1963 $904 million, in 1965 
$549 million, and in 1967 $880 million (Nihon ginko, 1974:  210).  Come the 1970s, they 
hiked their investment higher still, and increasingly took equity positions:  $3.5 billion in 
1969 (71 percent as equity), $4.3 billion in 1971 (63 percent equity), and even $2.9 
billion in recessionary 1973 (70 percent equity) (id.).  By the 1970s, any notion that the 
Japanese government had insulated the financial market from international competition 
stood subject to an annual $3-5 billion exception. 
 
B.  The Domestic Capital Market: 
  1.  Equity issues. -- The government never seriously regulated domestic equity 
issues.  Subject to routine corporate (e.g., par value) and securities (e.g., registration) 
rules, firms could sell stock as they pleased.  Granted, the stock they issued often came 
with preemptive rights to future issues.  Yet preemptive issues at submarket prices do not 
increase the cost of an issue.  Although they increase the number of shares necessary to 
raise a given amount, they do not increase the cost of raising it.  Instead, when investors 
disagree about the market value of existing stock, they simply let the firm raise equity at 
a price all investors consider fair.   
  And sell stock the firms did.  In 1964, TSE-listed firms raised 531 billion yen 
through 533 issues, in 1970 681 billion yen through 537 issues, and in 1975 1,001 billion 
yen through 285 issues.
5  To be sure, cross-country comparisons typically show much 
lower leverage among American firms than Japanese.  According to the recent consensus, 
however, the lower U.S. ratios merely reflect (Myers, 2001: 83; see Rajan & Zingales 
[1995]) “differences in accounting.”   
                     
5 Tokyo (1985:  110 tab. 37).  1965 was a low-year -- only 122 issues totalling 117 billion yen.  In 
the 1950s and 60s, the Bretton-Woods system pegged the yen at 360 yen per dollar. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 7 
  In effect, the modern consensus confirms what Kuroda & Oritani (1979) claimed 
years ago.  Although U.S. firms have a book debt/asset ratio of 37 percent (1991 data) 
where Japanese firms have 53 percent, adjusted for basic accounting differences the 
ratios fall to 33 (U.S.) and 37 (Japan) percent.  Although U.S. firms have a market 
debt/asset ratio of 28 percent where Japanese firms have 29 percent, adjusted for 
accounting differences the ratios fall to 23 (U.S.) and 17 percent (Japan) (Myers, 2001).  
Based on their study of mid-1970s firms, Kuroda & Oritani (1979) had estimated 
equity/asset ratios of 33.0 percent for U.S. firms and 47.4 percent for Japanese firms.  
They further calculated intermediated financing ratios of 50.4 percent for large U.S. firms 
and but only 46.7 percent for Japanese. 
  
  2.  Bond issues. -- Neither did the government formally restrict the bond market.  
To be sure, the major banks did try collectively to restrict the firms that could issue 
bonds.  Notwithstanding, companies used bonds to raise enormous amounts.  In 1965, 
TSE-listed firms raised 324 billion yen through 467 bond issues, and in 1970 509 billion 
yen through 306 issues.  By 1975, they raised 1,406 billion yen through 306 straight bond 
issues, 408 billion through 57 convertible issues, and 372 billion through 52 foreign 
issues (Tokyo, 1985:  111). 
  From the institutional investors who elsewhere bought bonds, Japanese firms also 
borrowed directly.  In the U.S., institutional investors like insurance companies 
traditionally bought most of the bonds firms issued.  In Japan, those investors also lent 
funds to industrial firms directly (Kuroda & Oritani, 1979: 19).   
 
C.  The Interest Rate Ceiling: 
  1.  The cap. -- During the 1960s and 70s, banks faced a cap on the interest they 
could charge their commercial borrowers.  They did not face a serious government-
imposed cap.  At 11.5 to 12.25 percent a year, the legal cap seldom structured 
commercial loans.  Rather, they faced a cap imposed by their own trade association on 
loans of more than 1 million yen for less than one year.  In the mid-1970s, it ranged from 
6.75 percent on the lowest risk loans to 8.5 percent for the highest.
6 
  It was a bizarre cap.  One can imagine lenders trying collectively to impose an 
interest-rate floor.  One can imagine borrowers trying collectively to obtain an interest-
rate cap.  Why lenders would want a cap is a tougher question.   
  Perhaps it is also a needless question.  For perhaps they imposed no such thing.  If 
the cap bound lenders, observed nominal interest rates should bunch at the mandated 
level.  They did not.  Instead, according to Figure 1 they ranged broadly.  With their blue-
chip customers, the city banks charged modal rates of 6.5 to 6.75 percent and their 
remaining customers rates of up to 9.75 percent.  With their smaller, riskier clients, the 
regional banks charged modal rates of 8.25 to 8.5 percent, and their remaining customers 
rates that ranged down to 5.75 percent.   
  Observed interest rates exceeded the cap because the cap applied only to large, 
short-term loans.  Suppose a bank wanted to lend at rates beyond the cap.  First, for a 
small client it could simply cut the amount of the loan.  It could either split it into several 
                     
6 Nihon ginko (1977: 168).  For account overdraws, the rate was 9.5 %.  After 1975, the trade 
association removed itself from the process.  Id., at 168-69.  See also Kitahara (1970: 70-71). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 8 
smaller loans, or lend some of the money and tell the firm to go elsewhere for the rest.  
Most firms did borrow only 10-20 percent of their debt from their lead lender anyway.  
Second, it could extend the loan term beyond the 1-year limit.  The 1-year loan term was 
arbitrary, after all.  Most banks regularly rolled over short-term loans. 
  City banks made 60-80 percent of their loans subject to the cap, while regional 
banks made 50-60 percent (see Table 1).  Given the ease with which either could avoid 
the regulation if they wished, that they nonetheless kept 50-80 percent within the 
regulatory framework suggests how loosely the regulations bound.  Given their lower-
risk clients, the city banks made only a third of their loans outside the framework.  Given 
their riskier customers, regional banks made half. 
 
  2.  “Compensating balances.” -- If banks could freely avoid the cap by adjusting 
the size or term of a loan, they should not have demanded deposits to adjust the effective 
interest charge.  For the most part, they did not.  Given how safe the larger firms were, 
banks never demanded deposits from them.  With the small firms, they largely stopped 
demanding the balances by the mid-1960s.
7   
  In order to reduce risk by letting the lender monitor cash flow, firms might still 
have routed their transactions through their lending bank.  If so, then cap or no cap the 
higher risk firms would voluntarily have kept deposits at their lead lenders.  In the mid-
1960s, MOF surveyed the use of “compulsory deposits” at various banks.  Starting at the 
same time but continuing haphazardly through the 1970s, the Fair Trade Commission 
(FTC) surveyed the use of the balances among smaller firms.  We reproduce the two 
surveys in Table 2.  According to Panel A (MOF), the banks used the practice only with 
the smaller firms, and abandoned it after the mid-1960s.  According to Panel B (FTC), 
banks similarly cut the use of the balances to the smaller firms, but never entirely 
abandoned them.  By 1979, of the FTC's 3,600 respondent firms 20 percent maintained 
formally compulsory deposits and 35 percent that they maintained informally compulsory 
deposits (Kosei, 1979: 1-3).  The former averaged 1.4 percent of a firm’s outstanding 
debt, and the latter 8.2 percent (id., at 3). 
  If firms had kept deposits at their lending bank voluntarily, then the level of bank 
deposits would not have fallen with the 1980s deregulation.  If the earlier deposits had 
been compulsory, however, then they would indeed have fallen during the 1980s.  They 
did not fall.  Instead, if anything average deposits/bank-loan ratios (cash and deposits, 
divided by short- and long-term bank borrowings; in percentages) for large firms 
(capitalized at 10 billion yen or more) increased:   
      1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
All  industries    29.9 30.9 29.7 30.5 31.8 42.2 28.2 
Manufacturing  firms  32.2 33.0 31.9 34.6 47.0 88.3 59.9 
(Okura sho, Hojin:  various years). 
                     
7 The appropriate measure of the compensating balances in these surveys is not the ”kosoku sei 
yokin,” but rather the “jishuku taisho yokin.”   Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 9 
Figure 1 






























































 Source:  Zenkoku chiho ginko kyokai, ed., Kin’yu ginko 
shotokei [Statistics for Finance and Banking] (Tokyo:  
Zenkoku chiho ginko kyokai, various years). 
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     Table 1:  Regulated and Unregulated Loans 
 
 
 Tot  Lns  Reg’d  Unreg’d  (LT)  (SmA) 
 
A.  City Banks 
1960    4,053  70.0 30.0 10.6 17.5  
1961    4,875  70.1 29.9 11.4 16.4  
1962    5,660  71.6 28.4 11.9 14.5  
1963    7,113  71.7 28.3 13.4 12.7  
1964    8,513  75.2 24.8 13.4 11.4  
1965    9,804  76.1 23.9 13.2 10.7  
1966  10,979  75.6 24.4 14.4 10.0 
1967  12,398  77.3 22.7 13.3   9.4 
1968  13,857  77.4 22.6 13.9   8.7 
1969  15,995  76.7 23.3 15.6   7.7 
1970  19,118  75.4 24.6 17.9   6.7 
1971  22,472  73.7 26.3 20.4   5.9 
1972  27,737  69.0 31.0 26.2   4.8 
1973  34,703  64.2 35.8 32.1   3.7 
1974  39,504  63.9 36.1 33.3   2.8 
1975  43,481  63.4 36.6 34.1   2.5 
 
B.  Regional Banks 
1960    1,897  52.8 47.2 10.0 34.4 
1961    2,346  54.9 45.1 10.2 31.8 
1962    2,816  57.5 42.7 10.5 28.9 
1963    3,476  58.4 41.6 10.6 27.6 
1964    4,269  62.1 37.9 11.8 26.1 
1965    4,820  63.2 36.8 12.9 23.9 
1966    5,561  63.7 36.3 14.5 21.8 
1967    6,597  63.7 36.3 16.4 19.9 
1968    7,734  64.5 35.5 17.5 18.0 
1969    8,988  64.9 35.1 19.3 15.8 
1970  10,015  64.1 35.9 21.6 14.3 
1971  11,944  63.6 36.4 23.5 12.9 
1972  14,526  60.9 39.1 28.5 10.6 
1973  18,348  59.3 40.7 32.4   8.3 
1974  21,482  60.8 39.2 32.8   6.4 
1975  24,044  60.6 39.4 33.8   5.6 
 
     Notes:  Tot Lns:  Total loans, in billion yen.  Reg’d gives the 
percentage of total loan amounts subject to the interest rate cap.  
Unreg’d gives the percentage of total loan amounts not subject to the 
interest rate cap; LT gives the percentage of such amounts not 
regulated because the stated term was 1 year or longer, and SmA gives 
the percentage unregulated because the face amount of the loan was 1 
million yen or less.  For 1960-63, some 1-4 percent of the loan 
amounts were unregulated because they were both small and long-term. 
 
     Source:  Zenkoku chiho ginko kyokai, ed., Kin’yu ginko shotokei 
[Statistics for Finance and Banking] (Tokyo:  Zenkoku chiho ginko 
kyokai, various years). 
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Table 2:  Compulsory Deposits/Loans (in %) 
 
 
    
A.  Min. of Finance  5/64  11/64  5/65  11/65 
City  Banks  3.6 1.0 0  0 
  Large firms    1.7    0.4    0    0 
  Sm & med firms    9.4    2.7    0    0 
Regional  Banks  5.1 1.3 0  - 
  Large firms    3.8    0.6    0    0 
  Sm & med firms    6.1    1.8    0    - 
Mutual  banks  13.2  8.3 5.1 2.6 
Cooperatives  11.7  6.8 4.1 2.5   
 
B.  FTC Formally  Informally 
(Sm & med firms only) compulsory  compulsory 
 1966  14.5  25.1 
 1968  9.8  25.3 
 1971  8.5  17.6 
 1973  4.1  16.8 
 1976  2.7  16.8 
 1978  1.5  10.3 
 
     Note:  The fraction of compulsory deposits to total loans, in 
percent.  In Panel A, we give the results of 4 Ministry of Finance 
surveys; in Panel B, we give the results of 6 FTC surveys of small- and 
medium-sized firms. 
 
 Sources:  Okura sho, ed., Ginko kyoku nempo [Annual Report of the 
Banking Bureau] (Tokyo:  Okura sho, 1965, 1966); Kosei torihiki iinkai, 
ed., Kosei yokin no jittai [The Reality of Compulsory Deposits] (Tokyo:  
Kosei torihiki iinkai, 1979) (31st survey report). 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
III.  Bank Loans in the Japanese Capital Market 
A.  The Determinants of Interest Rates: 
  1.  Introduction. -- By standard micro-economic theory, this haphazardly binding 
institutional framework should not have caused either credit shortages or rationing.  To 
explore what factors did determine the allocation of credit, we assemble a data set of over 
1,000 large Japanese firms in the 1970s, and estimate the supply function for bank loans.  
To date, most empirical studies of the Japanese credit market have used Bank of Japan 
data to estimate the determinants of average interest rates.  Obviously, that tells us 
nothing about the distribution of credit among firms.  By using firm-level data instead, 
we ask whether the observed credit allocation patterns differ from what one would expect 
in competitive capital markets. 
 
  2.  The model. -- To study the determinants of bank loans, we estimate a loan 
supply function.  Toward that end, we begin with a pair of structural equations in which 
the observed interest rate is a function of both the demand for and the supply of loans:
8   
                     
8 The use of a structural model and 2SLS is crucial, as OLS (used for this purpose by, e.g., Caves 
& Uekusa, 1976) will not disentangle the effects of demand and supply shifts.   Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 12 
id = f(bank debt, profit volatility, Q, sales, industry) 
is = g(bank debt, profit volatility, mortgageable assets, leverage, financial 
shareholdings, keiretsu affiliation) 
We posit, in other words, that potentially the amount of debt a firm demands at a 
given interest rate could depend on:  the volatility of its performance, its business 
opportunities (Tobin’s Q), its sales (reflecting its transactional demand for cash), and the 
industry in which it competes.  We further posit that potentially the amount a bank 
supplies at a given interest rate could depend on:  the volatility of the firm's performance, 
the security interests the firm can offer, and its equity cushion (leverage).  Arguably, the 
amount a bank supplies could also depend on the shares it holds in the firm or on the 
firm's keiretsu affiliation.
9 
Suppose the market for bank loans is competitive and subject neither to rationing 
nor to disguised interest charges through compensating balances.  In such a market, the 
interest rate at which a bank supplies funds will primarily reflect the volatility of a firm's 
performance.  It may also reflect the steps the bank can take to mitigate that risk, such as 
obtaining a security interest or providing an equity cushion.   
We estimate is through two-stage least squares.  We include surrogates for Tobin's 
Q in order to capture the business opportunities a firm faces -- important in determining a 
firm’s demand for funds.  Because we lack the data necessary to calculate Q itself, we use 
two proxies:  market capitalization/equity (denominated Surrogate Q) and operating 
income/total assets (denominated Profitability).  To ask whether (as sometimes asserted) 
bank dominance affects a bank's willingness to lend, we include both the percentage of a 
firm's shares held by financial institutions, and several measures of keiretsu affiliation.
10  
We use a vector of industry dummies to reflect industry-specific variation in demand 
patterns. 
  
2.  Variables. -- We use the means and variance of the financial variables, but 
calculate them separately for 1968-75 and 1976-82.  We do so because the "oil shock" of 
the mid-1970s divides the period into distinct economic environments.  During 1968 to 
1975, real GNE in Japan rose 54 percent.  By contrast, from 1975 to 1982 it rose only 22 
percent (Toyo, 1983).   
Tables 4 and 5 report our 2SLS coefficients calculated separately for the two 
periods.  Table 6 reports coefficients calculated using the means for the entire 1968-82 
range.  Table 3 gives selected summary statistics.  We define the following variables. 
 Interest  rate:  The ratio of a firm's interest expenses (#103 of the Nikkei NEEDS 
data base) to the sum of its bank debt (#46, 47, 63), long-term notes payable (#64), bonds 
(#48, 62), and discounted notes receivables (#142). 
Bank debt:  The sum of a firm's short- (#46) and long-term (#47, 63) borrowings. 
 Volatility:  The variance of the ratio of a firm's operating income (#95) to total 
assets (#89).  
                     
9 In a recent review of corporate financing literature in the 40 years after MM, Myers (2001) 
reports empirically that debt/equity ratios tend to be lower when a firm is smaller, is riskier, has more 
intangible assets, and is more profitable.  He also finds considerable industry-specific variation. 
10 In Miwa & Ramseyer (2001), we give the genesis of the concept of "keiretsu," and explain why 
it proxies for nothing of substance. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 13 
 Mortgageable  assets:  The ratio of a firm's tangible assets (#21) to total assets 
(#89). 
 Leverage:  The ratio of a firm's total liabilities (#77) to total assets (#89). 
 Surrogate  Q:  The ratio of a firm's stock market capitalization (at the end of a 
firm’s April-March fiscal year) over its equity (#78). 
 Profitability:  The ratio of a firm's operating income (#95) to total assets (#89). 
 Sales:  A firm's net sales (#90). 
 Financial  shares:  The fraction of a firm's shares held by financial institutions 
(#202/#201).   
 Keiretsu  dummies:  We calculate three measures of keiretsu affiliation as of 1975.  
First, we take the roster found in Research on the Keiretsu (Keizai chosa kai, 1976; 
definition [3], see Miwa & Ramseyer, 2001).  This is the roster behind the well-known 
Nakatani (1984) and Hoshi, Kashyap & Scharfstein (1990, 1991) studies.  Second, we 
look to the groups of firms whose presidents meet occasionally for lunch (Toyo keizai, 
1975).  These lunch clubs are also more majesterially known as "presidents' councils."  
Third, we examine main bank affiliation (from id.).  We follow scholarly custom in 
defining the main bank as the bank from which a firm borrows the greatest amount.  For a 
fuller discussion of these definitions, see Miwa & Ramseyer (2001). 
Industry dummies:  See summary statistics.  In general, we rely on regressions 
over all industries.  To check whether manufacturing firms are relevantly different from 
others, in Table 4 we also report regressions on the manufacturing firms only. 
    
3.  The data. -- We assemble our basic financial data from the Nikkei NEEDS 
data base.  We use data on all Tokyo Stock Exchange Section 1 firms (the largest firms) 
from 1968 to 1982.  After dropping firms with 2 years of data or less and extreme 
outlyers, we obtain the sample described in Table 3.  We take our keiretsu measures from 
Keizai chosa (1976) and Toyo keizai (1975).  We use stock price data from the Daiwa 
securities firm (Daiwa). 
 
4.  The results. -- (a) Risk.  The results largely corroborate our hypothesis that the 
capital market cleared:  interest rates reflect risk, and show no evidence of rationing (see 
Table 4).  According to our basic results, firm volatility strongly predicts the interest rate 
banks charge for credit.  Whether we look at the early period (1968-75) or later (1976-
82), whether we look at all industries or only manufacturing firms, and whether we 
instrument the demand for loans with our proxy for Q or firm profitability -- whatever set 
of measures we use, the coefficient on firm volatility is consistently positive and 
statistically significant.  
 
(b) Mortgageable assets.  As basic logic predicts, firms with large stocks of 
mortgageable assets borrow at lower rates.  This result, however, is less robust than the 
results for volatility.  It appears only for 1968-75, and only in three of the four Table 4 
estimates.   
 
(c) Equity cushion.  The impact of a firm's equity cushion (inversely proxied by 
leverage) on interest rates is non-linear.  Initially, an increase in leverage is associated 
with lower interest rates, but at high leverage levels interest rates again rise.  We offer no Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 14 
explanation for why interest rates would fall with leverage at lower levels.  That they 
would increase at higher leverage levels, however, is exactly what one would expect.  
The most plausible estimates are those for 1968-75 for the largest sample (Table 4, Panel 
A):  interest rates rise as leverage climbs beyond 89 percent (for all firms) or 84 percent 
(for manufacturing firms).  
Potentially, of course, the level of leverage at a firm will depend on the interest 
rate the firm must pay to borrow.  To address this endogeneity, we re-run our Table 4 
regressions without leverage or leverage squared.  The crucial results remain largely 
unchanged:  in all the 1968-75 estimates, the coefficient on volatility ranges from 2.1 to 
2.5 with a t-statistic between 1.49 and 4.25; in the 1976-82 estimates, it ranges from 
0.928 to 1.769 with a t-statistic between 1.41 and 3.43. 
 
(d) Q.  By basic finance theory, Tobin’s Q is the appropriate proxy for a firm’s 
business opportunities, and the 2SLS estimates in Panel B use our surrogate Q.  This 
presents two problems.  First, we have neither the market value of a firm's debt nor the 
replacement costs of its assets.  As a result, our surrogate Q simply measures the ratio of 
a firm's market capitalization to accounting capital.  Second, for the first period (1968-
75), we have stock price data only for a minority of the firms.  Accordingly, the use of Q 
dramatically lowers sample size.   
Given these problems with our surrogate Q, in Panel A we instrument bank debt 
with accounting profitability.  Largely, this yields results consistent with regressions 
using surrogate Q (Panel B).  To exploit the much larger data base, in our later 
regressions (Tables 5 and 6) we use profitability.  
  
(e) Bank dominance.  Several scholars argue that Japanese banks use their 
influence over the firms most dependent on them to extract rents through high interest 
chages.  Caves & Uekusa (1976) first made this claim when they purported to show that 
keiretsu firms faced higher interest rates than independent firms.  Weinstein & Yafeh 
(1998) repeated the claim, and similar assertions appear in such studies as Morck & 
Nakamura (1990) and Macey & Miller (1995).   
In fact, Tables 4 through 6 show nothing of the sort.  The more heavily financial 
institutions have invested in a firm, the lower the interest rate a firm pays.  We have no 
theory about why the interest rate should fall with bank shareholdings.  Suffice it to say 
that the evidence is inconsistent with any claim that banks raise rates at the firms they 
most dominate. 
Neither do banks charge higher interest rates to firms within their keiretsu.  
Instead, keiretsu affiliation is simply irrelevant.  Whichever period one examines and 
whichever keiretsu roster one uses, the coefficients are almost uniformly insignificant.  
For reasons we explain in detail elsewhere (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2001), this is exactly 
what one would expect.  Given that keiretsu affiliation proxies for nothing of substance, 
the correctly estimated coefficient on keiretsu affiliation would be zero.  Zero it generally 
is.  Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 15 
Table 3:  Selected Summary Statistics 
 
   1968-75          1976-82 
 n  Min  Mean  Max  . n  Min  Mean  Max  . 
Interest rate  1003   .022  .086  .468  1094      0  .091   .463 
Bank Debt (billion yen)  1022      0    24   871  1138      0    44   1940 
Volatility  1022      0  .001  .029  1138      0  .001   .045 
Mortgageable assets  1022      0  .277  .857  1138   .002  .232   .832 
Leverage  1022   .147  .762  1.154  1138    .124  .746  1.518 
financial  shares    965   .001  .278 .754 1068   .004  .293   .755 
Surrogate Q   267    .06   1.7   8.2   760     .3   2.1    8.7 
Profitability  1022 -.331  .081 .554 1138 -.097  .069   .524 
Sales (billion yen)  1022   .068    78  5204  1138   .920   165  11100 
 
Keiretsu dummies:        n       mean                n        mean 
  1.  By Research on the keiretsu 
  Mitsui  1022  .081  1137  .073 
  Mitsubishi  1022  .108  1137  .097 
  Sumitomo  1022  .100  1137  .091 
  Fuji  1022  .076  1137  .069 
  DKB  1022  .049  1137  .044 
  Sanwa  1022  .051  1137  .046 
  2.  By lunch club membership 
  Mitsui  1022  .013  1137  .011 
  Mitsubishi  1022  .010  1137  .009 
  Sumitomo  1022  .012  1137  .011 
  Fuji  1022  .022  1137  .019 
  DKB  1022  .023  1137  .021 
  Sanwa  1022  .030  1137  .027 
  3.  By main bank affiliation 
    Mitsui   731  .056   736  .056 
    Mitsubishi   731  .071   736  .071 
    Sumitomo   731  .082   736  .083 
    Fuji   731  .078   736  .077 
    DKB   731  .093   736  .092 
    Sanwa   731  .063   736  .063 
 
Industry dummies:        n       mean                n        mean 
Construction 1022  .100  1138  .097 
Trade 1022  .100  1138  .121 
Service & finance  1022  .038  1138  .052 
Util & transp  1022  .083  1138  .078 
Light industry  1022  .125  1138  .123 
Chemicals 1022  .157  1138  .149 
Metals 1022  .118  1138  .109 
Machinery 1022  .279  1138  .272 
 
 
 Sources:  Nippon keizai shimbun sha, Nikkei zaimu 
deeta [Nikkei Financial Data] (NEEDS), on line; Toyo keizai, 
ed., Kigyo keiretsu soran [Firm Keiretsu Overview], Nov. 
1975; Keizai chosa kai, ed., Keiretsu no kenkyu [Research on 
the Keiretsu] (Tokyo:  Keizai chosa kai, 1975); [stock price 
data.] Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 16 
Table 4:  Determinants of Interest Rates --  





A.  Using Profitability: 
       All industries     Manufacturing only 
     1968-75   1976-82   .     1968-75   1976-82   . 
Volatility  1.423 (3.25)  2.028 (3.87)  1.618 (2.84)  1.378 (2.36) 
Mortgageable assets  -.015 (2.58)   .001 (0.12)  -.009 (0.80)   .018 (1.16) 
Leverage  -.305 (5.78)  -.154 (3.01)  -.443 (5.13)  -.156 (2.62) 
Leverage squared   .174 (4.67)   .055 (1.53)   .265 (4.36)   .056 (1.35) 
Financial shares  -.014 (2.20)   .004 (0.42)  -.017 (1.96)  -.005 (0.43) 
Bank debt   .246 (1.37)   .142 (1.17)   1.39 (4.93)   .690 (3.02) 
 
n      948     1026     649     684 
 
Dependent variable:  Interest rate. 
 




B.  Using Surrogate Q: 
       All industries     Manufacturing only 
     1968-75   1976-82   .     1968-75   1976-82   . 
Volatility  2.319 (2.15)  1.368 (2.19)  2.125 (1.65)  1.352 (1.85) 
Mortgageable assets  -.080 (3.24)   .001 (0.14)  -.114 (2.98)   .021 (1.16) 
Leverage  -.260 (1.72)  -.181 (2.48)  -.520 (1.73)  -.134 (1.38) 
Leverage squared   .048 (0.43)   .078 (1.48)   .222 (1.02)   .041 (0.59) 
Financial shares  -.060 (2.90)   .003 (0.25)  -.079 (2.75)  -.004 (0.29) 
Bank debt (/10
7)   9.30 (5.32)   .079 (0.67)   11.1 (4.83)   .565 (2.43) 
 
n      258      728      196      505 
 
Dependent variable:  Interest rate. 
 








 Notes:  The regressions are two-stage least squares, 
treating bank debt as endogenous.  Coefficients, followed by 
the absolute value of the t-statistics.  All regressions 
include a constant term, not reported here. 
 
 Sources:  See Table 3. 
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Table 5:  Determinants of Interest Rates -- 
The Influence of Keiretsu, 1968-75 and 1976-82 
 
A.  Specific Keiretsu: 
  .     1968-75             . .     1976-82             .
Volatility  1.446 (3.03) 1.404 (3.20) 2.112 (4.02) 1.939 (3.68) 2.026 (3.86) 1.902 (3.76)
Mortg'ble assets  -.014 (2.42) -.015 (2.56) -.018 (2.77)  .001 (0.08)  .001 (0.11) -.007 (0.76)
Leverage  -.310 (5.85) -.304 (5.72) -.333 (5.00) -.161 (3.12) -.154 (2.99) -.143 (2.61)
Leverage squared   .176 (4.73)  .173 (4.61)  .192 (4.08)  .057 (1.61)  .055 (1.52)  .048 (1.31)
Finan shares  -.017 (2.61) -.012 (1.91) -.013 (1.83) -.000 (0.02)  .005 (0.51) -.003 (0.29)
Bank debt (/10
7)   .239 (1.33)  .319 (1.60)  .402 (2.21)  .137 (1.13)  .142 (1.09)  .124 (1.16)
Research on the Keiretsu: 
Mitsui    .003 (0.89)      .010 (2.01) 
Mi'bishi    .001 (0.32)      .003 (0.61) 
Sumitomo    .004 (1.49)      .001 (0.19) 
Fuji    .007 (2.21)      .003 (0.60) 
DKB   .003 (0.70)     -.004 (0.64) 
Sanwa  -.000 (0.05)      .002 (0.38) 
Lunch clubs: 
Mitsui     -.002  (0.28)    -.004  (0.31) 
Mi'bishi     -.008 (0.86)      .009 (0.69) 
Sumitomo     -.005  (0.61)    -.004  (0.33) 
Fuji     -.005  (0.87)    -.000  (0.03) 
DKB   -.002  (0.33)    -.002  (0.24) 
Sanwa   -.003  (0.56)    -.005  (0.72) 
Main banks: 
Mitsui        .003 (0.64)     -.000 (0.03)
Mi'bishi      -.002  (0.53)    -.001  (0.13)
Sumitomo      -.005  (1.18)    -.002  (0.51)
Fuji        .002 (0.51)     -.000 (0.04)
DKB      .008  (2.27)    -.005  (1.02)
Sanwa    -.001  (0.15)    -.002  (0.42)
 
n      948      948      729     1026     1026      721 
Dependent variable:  Interest rate. 
Instruments of bank debt:  Profitability, volatility, sales, industry dummies. 
 
 
B.  Grouped Keiretsu: 
  .     1968-75             . .     1976-82             .
Volatility  1.455 (3.33) 1.405 (3.21) 2.104 (4.00) 2.035 (3.89) 2.030 (3.87) 1.935 (3.87)
Mortg'ble assets  -.014 (2.50) -.015 (2.59) -.018 (2.68)  .001 (0.17)  .001 (0.10) -.007 (0.80)
Leverage  -.307 (5.82) -.305 (5.77) -.346 (5.20) -.156 (3.03) -.153 (2.98) -.140 (2.57)
Leverage squared   .174 (4.69)  .173 (4.65)  .202 (4.29)  .055 (1.53)  .054 (1.51)  .046 (1.26)
Finan shares  -.017 (2.62) -.012 (1.92) -.013 (1.73)  .000 (0.02)  .005 (0.53) -.002 (0.25)
Bank debt (/10
7)   .237 (1.33)  .301 (1.58)  .222 (1.20)  .142 (1.18)  .157 (1.24)  .125 (1.18)
Any ROK   .003 (1.71)      .003 (1.03) 
Any lunch club    -.004 (1.20)     -.002 (0.54) 
Any main bank       .001 (0.58)     -.002 (0.72)
 
n      948      948      729     1026     1026      721 
Dependent variable:  Interest rate. 
Instruments of bank debt:  Profitability, volatility, sales, industry dummies. 
 
 Notes:  The regressions are two-stage least squares, treating bank debt as 
endogenous.  Coefficients, followed by the absolute value of the t-statistics.  The 
data include all industries.  All regressions include a constant term, not reported 
here. 
 
 Sources:  See Table 3. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 18 





.                     . 
Volatility  2.637 (5.44)  2.652 (5.47)  2.649 (5.47)  2.637 (5.44) 
Mortg'ble assets  -.013 (1.64)  -.013 (1.60)  -.013 (1.62)  -.014 (1.66) 
Leverage  -.217 (3.21)  -.217 (3.22)  -.217 (3.22)  -.216 (3.19) 
Leverage squared   .095 (1.99)   .095 (1.98)   .095 (2.00)   .095 (1.98) 
Finan shares  -.004 (0.44)  -.007 (0.81)  -.006 (0.70)  -.003 (0.38) 
Bank debt (/10
7)   .206 (1.24)   .205 (1.24)   .163 (0.94)   .205 (1.24) 
Any ROK     .003 (1.10) 
Any lunch club       .005 (1.17) 
Any main bank        -.001 (0.27) 
 
n     1044     1044     1044      1044 
 
 
Dependent variable:  Interest rate. 
Instruments of bank debt:  Profitability, volatility, sales, 
industry dummies. 
 
 Notes:  The regressions are two-stage least squares, 
treating bank debt as endogenous.  Coefficients, followed by the 
absolute value of the t-statistics.  The data include all 
industries.  All regressions include a constant term, not 
reported here. 
 
 Sources:  See Table 3. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
B.  Determinants of Bank Deposits: 
  1.  Introduction. -- Turn then to the factors that best predict the amount of deposits 
a firm will keep.  As noted earlier, many observers claim that Japanese banks routinely 
demanded deposits to raise the effective interest rate they charged on their loans.   
According to the very documents on which these observers rely, however, banks never 
demanded deposits from large firms -- and our sample (TSE Section 1 firms) includes 
only large firms. 
  Suppose, however, that banks did demand deposits to raise interest rates.  All else 
equal, deposits should be positively associated with three sets of variables:  with loan 
interest rates, with the amount of bank debt, and with keiretsu affiliation and bank 
shareholdings.  First, deposits would be positively associated with interest rates because 
banks would disproportionately demand them from firms facing the regulatory interest 
cap.  By contrast, we hypothesize (i) that deposits help a bank monitor a debtor's 
performance, (ii) that deposits partially substitute for mortgages, and (iii) that higher 
interest rates raise the cost of holding large deposits.  For all these reasons we predict that 
deposits will be negatively associated with observed interest rates.   Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 19 
  Second, if banks demand deposits to raise interest rates, deposits would also be 
positively associated with debt levels.  After all, a bank would need a bigger deposit to 
raise the effective interest rate on a bigger loan.  By contrast, we predict no relation 
between deposits and loans.   
  Third, if (as the conventional wisdom asserts) banks exploit those firms most 
dependent on them, they would exploit firms in their keiretsu and in which they have 
large equity stakes.  If so, then financial shareholdings and keiretsu affiliation would both 
be positively associated with deposit levels.  By contrast, for the reasons discussed earlier 
we expect no relation between deposits and these variables.   
  In addition, observed interest rate held constant, we predict that the size of 
deposits will be associated:  (i) positively with sales, since sales amounts reflect the 
transactional demand for cash; (ii) negatively with the supply of mortgageable assets, 
since deposits partially substitute for mortgages; and (iii) positively with the volatility of 
firm performance, again since deposits partially substitute for mortgages (and volatile 
firms stand to gain the most from providing mortgages). 
 
  2.  The model, data and variables. -- We employ a simple OLS model: 
Deposits = h(interest rate, bank debt, mortgageable assets, sales, volatility,  
financial shareholdings, keiretsu affiliation) 
We use the same data sets we used above, but normalize the relevant variables by firm 
size.  We define the following variables: 
Deposits/assets:  The ratio of a firm's cash and deposits (NEEDS, #3) to total 
assets (#89). 
Interest rate:  As defined above. 
Bank debt/assets:  The ratio of a firm's bank debt (#46, 47, 63) to total assets 
(#89). 
Mortgageable assets/assets:  The ratio of a firm's tangible assets (#21) to total 
assets (#89). 
Sales/assets:  The ratio of a firm's net sales (#90) to total assets (#89). 
Volatility, Inter rate, Financial shares, Keiretsu and industry dummies:  As 
defined above. 
 
3.  Results. -- As we expected, the results in Table 7 indicate that banks did not 
use “compensating deposits” to raise effective interest rates.  Instead, deposit levels are 
negatively and significantly associated with observed interest rates in all specifications.  
Only insignificantly are they associated with bank loan levels.  The results also suggest 
that deposits substitute for mortgageable assets:  the coefficients on mortgageable assets 
are consistently and strongly negative, while the coefficients on volatility are positive 
(though only haphazardly significant).  The coefficients on sales remain a puzzle:   
positive for 1968-75 as predicted, but negative for 1976-82. 
The coefficients on shareholdings by financial institutions are significantly 
negative -- rebutting the claim that banks used their power to extract rents.  The 
coefficients on the keiretsu dummies similarly rebut the claim that banks used their 
power to extract rents from group firms:  no matter what definition we use, the 
coefficients are either negative or insignificant. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 20 
 





A.  1968-75 Manufac.  only          All industries          . 
Interest rate  -.238 (3.49)  -.161 (2.50)  -.197 (3.13)  -.207 (3.34)  -.175 (2.68) 
Bank debt/asts   .019 (1.18)   .017 (1.32)   .005 (0.37)   .009 (0.70)  -.008 (0.55) 
Mortg/assets  -.154 (7.78)  -.131 (9.64)  -.148(10.81)  -.150(11.12)  -.143 (9.81) 
Sales/assets   .023 (3.67)   .011 (2.64)   .007 (1.54)   .008 (1.77)   .007 (1.50) 
Volatility  2.931 (3.21)  2.208 (2.63)   .911 (1.08)   .755 (0.91)   .520 (0.57) 
Finan shares      -.074 (6.19)  -.063 (5.37)  -.068 (5.53) 
Research on the Keiretsu: 
 Mitsui      -.024  (3.93)  
 Mitsubishi      -.002  (0.28)  
 Sumitomo      -.008  (1.45)  
 Fuji      -.002  (0.35)  
 DKB      -.010  (1.33)  
 Sanwa      -.018  (2.44)  
Lunch clubs: 
  Mitsui     -.047  (3.32) 
  Mitsubishi     -.050  (3.10) 
  Sumitomo     -.042  (2.83) 
  Fuji     -.033  (2.97) 
  DKB     -.024  (2.26) 
  Sanwa     -.032  (3.48) 
Main banks: 
  Mitsui      -.011  (1.48) 
  Mitsubishi        .009  (1.25) 
  Sumitomo        .001  (0.09) 
  Fuji        .007  (1.03) 
  DKB        .002  (0.24) 
  Sanwa      -.008  (1.10) 
 
 
n:       678     1003      948      948      729 Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 21 
 




B.  1976-82 Manufac  only          All industries                   . 
Interest rate  -.180 (3.73)  -.092 (2.09)  -.132 (3.03)  -.136 (3.18)  -.120 (2.16) 
Bank debt/asts   .010 (0.74)  -.004 (0.32)   .004 (0.35)   .009 (0.77)   .003 (0.24) 
Mortg/assets  -.140 (7.02)  -.135 (9.45)  -.148(10.56)  -.148(10.73)  -.129 (7.93) 
Sales/assets  -.007 (1.40)   .002 (0.52)  -.007 (2.17)  -.007 (2.01)  -.007 (1.71) 
Volatility  1.387 (2.05)  1.631 (2.27)   .817 (1.17)   .672 (0.98)   .428 (0.61) 
Finan shares      -.068 (5.53)  -.053 (4.50)  -.058 (4.22) 
Research on the Keiretsu: 
 Mitsui      -.016  (2.43) 
  Mitsubishi       .001 (0.11) 
 Sumitomo      -.008  (1.28) 
  Fuji       .005 (0.71) 
 DKB      -.012  (1.49) 
 Sanwa      -.018  (2.30) 
Lunch clubs: 
  Mitsui     -.043  (2.82) 
  Mitsubishi     -.055  (3.30) 
  Sumitomo     -.036  (2.38) 
  Fuji     -.035  (3.11) 
  DKB     -.027  (2.40) 
  Sanwa     -.034  (3.49) 
Main banks: 
  Mitsui        .002  (0.29) 
  Mitsubishi        .013  (1.73) 
  Sumitomo      -.002  (0.32) 
  Fuji        .007  (1.06) 
  DKB      -.000  (0.03) 
  Sanwa      -.006  (0.82) 
 
 
n:        710     1094     1026     1026      721 
 




Notes:  The regressions are ordinary least squares.  Coefficients, 
followed by the absolute value of the t-statistics.  All regressions 
include a constant term and industry dummies, not reported here.   
 
Sources:  See Table 3. 
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IV.  Credit Rationing in Ocean Shipping 
A.  The Programs: 
To give context to the institutional detail and econometric results, consider what 
happened in one of the industries where the Japanese government tried hardest to ration 
credit.  More specifically, consider finance patterns among the ocean shipping firms 
during the heyday of Japan's rapid economic growth.  The war had left shipping firms 
decimated, and the government apparently decided to help them rebuild.  Toward that 
end, it aggressively tried to manipulate investment.  Although it started during the 
occupation, it tried even harder during the mid-1960s. 
The shipping industry did grow.  Given the custom of registering ships in nominal 
places like Panama or Liberia, national capacity can be hard to estimate.  Still, from 1955 
to 1975, Japanese-flag capacity increased from 4 million tons to 40.  By 1975, no country 
except Liberia with its 66 million tons could claim more.
11 
To the shipping and shipbuilding firms the government did offer massive 
subsidies.  From 1961 to 1970, it routed the shipping firms 33.7 percent of all Japan 
Development Bank (JDB) loans.  To shipbuilding firms preparing vessels for export, it 
routed 48.3 percent of all Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) loans.
12   According to 
Horiuchi & Otaki (1987: 128), during the early years of the decade shipping firms 
obtained over half their capital investment from the government.  Only coal mining firms 
kept their dependence levels higher. 
  By these loans, the government transferred enormous wealth.  The JDB raised its 
funds (through the Ministry of Finance's so-called "Fiscal Investment & Loan Program") 
from government-run financial institutions like the postal savings system.  It then lent the 
funds to private firms at 6.5 percent (Nihon senshu, 1970:  177).  To shipping firms on 
approved projects, it lent 60-80 percent of the cost of a ship, and spread repayment over 
11-13 years (Nihon senshu, 1970:  166, 173).   
The subsidies did not stop there.  First, the government used the general budget to 
cut the cost of JDB loans further.  For much of the 1960s, it forgave 2.5 percent of the 6.5 
percent interest, and charged shipping firms only the remaining 4 percent (Nihon senshu, 
1970:  177-78).  Second, it informally guaranteed private-sector loans for the rest of the 
cost of a ship.  In exchange, the banks loaned shipping firms the necessary funds at 8.4 to 
9.1 percent, and extended repayment over 8 years.
13   
Third, usually the government paid 2-3 percent of the stated interest on the 
private-sector loans.  As a result, shipping firms borrowed from private banks at 6 to 7.1 
                     
11 Nihon senshu (various years).  Other countries in 1975 -- U.K.:  33 million tons; Norway:  26 
million tons; Greece:  23 million tons; U.S.S.R.:  19 million tons; U.S.A.:  15 million tons. 
12 Nihon zosen (1980).  The annual ratios of shipping firm loans from the JDB ranged from 17.8 % 
(1962) to 44.7 % (1965).  The mean of the annual ratios was 31.8 %.  Over the decade, annual total loans 
by the JDB averaged 204 billion yen.  The annual ratios of shipbuilding firm loans from the Ex-Im Bank 
ranged from 40.8 % (1961) to 58.4 % (1964).  The mean of the annual ratios was 48.6%.  Over the decade, 
annual total loans by the Ex-Im Bank averaged 247 billion yen. 
13 Nihon senshu (1970: 166).  Eight years from delivery of the ship.  The terms were determined 
through negatiations between the bank trade association and the government.  For details of the 
negotiations, see Ginko kyokai (1965: 347-67). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 23 
percent net.
14  In effect, those who complied with the government program borrowed 
most of the cost of a ship from the JDB at 4 percent, and the remainder from private 
banks at 6-7 percent.   
Last, if financially troubled, the government let shipping firms defer repayment 
even beyond the (already generous) contractual terms.  When shipping firms found 
themselves in distress after the Suez Canal reopened in the late 1950s, for example, it 
deferred their JDB obligations.  It then induced private banks to allow similar deferrals.   
 
B.  Sanko: 
1.  The issue. -- If the program's structure is clear, its effect is less so.  Reflecting 
the standard wisdom, Hoshi & Kashyap (2001: 159) argue that the program enabled the 
government "tightly [to] regulate[] the number of new vessels that could be produced 
each year."  Yet to do so the government would have needed both (i) to stop firms from 
borrowing at market rates on non-approved projects, and (ii) to stop them from 
arbitraging funds from approved projects to the non-approved.   
If the government could stop both unapproved loans and arbitrage, it had at least a 
shot at regulating investment.  If not, it would seldom have affected a firm's returns on its 
marginal investments (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2001b: 196-97).  Not changing marginal 
calculations, it would seldom have affected either the level or direction of investments.  
Not affecting output, for better or worse it would not have implemented any "industrial 
policy."   
So -- could the government stop unapproved loans and arbitrage? 
 
2.  The strategy. -- Among the shipping firms, none was more outspoken than the 
Sanko steamship firm.  Before the early 1950s, Sanko had taken government subsidies 
and complied with government mandates.  In the mid-1950s, however, it decided to go it 
alone.  Rather than take and comply, it would raise its own funds and follow its own 
plans.  While its rivals stayed within the government’s orbit, it repaid its JDB loans and 
turned exclusively to private capital (Table 8, Panel D). 
In Sanko’s eyes, the subsidies brought too much control.  Loans always come 
with terms, of course -- whether in Japan or in the U.S., whether from the government or 
from private banks.  Sanko was willing to accept the terms private creditors and investors 
imposed.  It was not willing to accede to the government's.   
For Sanko, the government loans presented several problems.  First, the 
government claimed to be rebuilding the industry to its pre-war glory.  Because regular, 
scheduled freight liners had been central to the industry pre-war, it focused the post-war 
program on liners as well.  As Sanko saw it, though, the industry had shifted.  The future 
lay not with standard liners, but with industry-specific ships like oil tankers, operating on 
shipper-specific schedules.  If it accepted the subsidies, it would need to focus on a sector 
it no longer saw as central. 
Second, for its loans the government imposed a lengthy and uncertain application 
process and offered only year-by-year clearance.  Again as Sanko saw it, to meet its 
clients' requirements it needed to be able to plan over several years.  Rather than apply 
                     
14  Nihon senshu (1970: 176-79).  The subsidies called for partial repayment if profits/capital 
exceeded 10 % (id., at 167). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 24 
annually for funds it might or might not obtain, it needed to be able to work with its 
clients on an on-going basis. 
Third, through the JDB loan terms the govenment obtained a veto over any new 
projects at the firm.  To Sanko, this posed trouble on two fronts.  On the one hand, in 
order to help the industry earn monopoly rents, the government often wanted to block 
construction just when Sanko -- as industry renegade -- wanted to expand.  On the other, 
the government wanted Sanko under the control of (and perhaps as a mere division of) a 
larger, more compliant shipping firm.  To reduce competition, it had decided to 
consolidate the industry into six firms (or firms under the control of the six), and Sanko 




3.  The results. -- Sanko jettisoned the government subsidies all the way to the 
bank.  It had opened the 1950s with virtually nothing.  It closed the 1960s as the most 
profitable firm in the industry.  During the last half of the decade, it earned shareholder 
returns of 32 percent a year, and by the early 1970s 62 percent (Table 8, Panel E).  Its 
closest rival during the late 1960s was Showa, but it earned only 17 percent and in the 
early 1970s only 32 percent.  Its closest rival during the early 1970s was Japan Lines, but 
it earned only 50 percent and in the late 1960s only 9 percent.  
OPEC transformed the industry in 1973 (more on this in Subsection D, below), 
but by then Sanko had grown from the sixth ranked firm (in 1964) to the very largest.  
From a stock-market capitalization of 3.59 billion yen in 1964, it had boomed to 514 
billion yen by 1973, three-times its nearest rival (Table 8, Panel A).  Despite making no 
"approved" vesels, it commanded a shipping capacity second only to Japan Lines (Table 
8, Panel B).  Despite refusing to participate in the government’s loan program, it serviced 
the third largest debt in the industry (Table 8, Panel C).
16   
Flout as it did government policy, Sanko raised funds straightforwardly.  First, it 
sold stock and retained its earnings.  In 1952, it had had paid-in capital of only 420 
million yen.  By 1956, it had 1,300 million yen, by 1964 4,700 million yen, and by 1974 
31,000 million (Kaisha nenkan, 1960; Sanko, 1968; Kyoiku sha, 1980: 76). 
Second, it leased.  From 1963 to 1971, Sanko increased the number of ships it 
controlled from 13 to 108.  It did not buy them all.  Instead, about half of the 108 it leased 
(Sanko securities filings).  Depending on the contractual terms, leasing can have identical 
economic effects as borrowing.  For Sanko, the identity presented a standard financing 
strategy. 
Third, it borrowed.  On the one hand, Sanko borrowed from banks.  Sometimes it 
borrowed from a single bank, sometimes from multiple banks (Sanko securities filing, 
Mar. 1961:  496 et seq.).  Generally, it arranged for its client -- the firm on whose behalf 
it would eventually operate the ship -- to guarantee it business (Sanko, 1968: 99).   
                     
15  The government also pressured private banks not to fund Sanko.  Through their trade 
association, the banks had agreed to report any new loans they made to shipping firms to the association.  
Now the government could urge them not to fund non-conformist firms like Sanko. 
16 Nor was it just quantity.  It was quality too.  Throughout the period, Sanko relentlessly upgraded 
its fleet, selling unprofitable ships, and modernizing and automating what it kept (Kyoiku sha, 1980: 32-
33). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 25 
On the other, Sanko negotiated deferred payments to the builders from which it 
bought its ships (Sanko securities fillings, Sept. 1966: 14).  The trick involved arbitrage.  
Even if the government could discourage banks from lending directly to Sanko, it did not 
try to prevent banks from lending to shipbuilding firms that sold to Sanko.  If those firms 
then let Sanko defer its payments to them, they effectively arbitraged their own credit.  
Suppose a firm obtained a subsidized loan through the Export-Import Bank to sell ship A 
abroad.  If it then deferred payment on the ship B it sold Sanko, it even arbitraged the 
government loan on the exported ship.   
The moral is simple.  During the 1960s, the government intervened heavily in the 
ocean shipping industry.  It intervened for a specific purpose (rebuild the industry), and 
offered compliant firms massive subidies (low-cost loans).  Throughout the decade, it did 
what it could to run Sanko out of business:  it paid competitors subsidies, but not Sanko; 
it lent competitors money, but not Sanko; it encouraged private banks to lend to 
competitors, but not to Sanko.  Ever the non-conformist, Sanko flouted all this to 
spectacular success.  By the early 1970s it had raised enough funds to catapult itself into 
preeminence, and generated high enough profits to earn its investors huge returns.  
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A.  Stock Market Capitalization (in million yen): 
 
   1964   1968    1973    1978 
Sanko   3,591   6,615  514,062  163,697 
*NYK 18,104  28,908  146,439  162,383 
*Mitsui OSK  11,004  26,800  112,800  109,435 
*Japan Lines  11,099  14,406  153,731   83,580 
*Kawasaki   7,740  17,280  101,655   45,098 
*Yamashita   2,740   7,905   45,540   34,425 
*Showa   2,160   6,750   29,160   24,300 
Shinwa   1,427   3,600   15,012   22,194 
Daiichi    1,000   2,320    5,400   12,240 
Iino   2,924   3,456   14,688   13,920 
 
 Notes:  In Panels A-C, we use 1964 data rather than 1963 because of mergers 
in 1964 between listed and unlisted firms (about which data are not available). 
  * Firms designated as “core” firms under government policy.  The government 
hoped to consolidate the industry around these six. 
 
 
B.  Capacity (Number of Ships, 1000 tons): 
 
   1964    1968    1973    1978    . 
Sanko   13    280   53  1,858  173  12,255  305  24,637 
NYK  172 1,925  261 4,993  299 10,867  305 12,321 
Mitsui  OSK  245 2,548  289 4,738  291 10,372  282 10,058 
Japan  Lines  102 1,493  129 3,123  259 15,673  238 19,745 
Kawasaki  135 1,684    189 4,246  206   7,775  199   9,970 
Yamashita  127  1,143   130  2,971  190   8,688  178   8,795 
Showa   53    844   70  1,754  123   4,756  138   5,905 
Shinwa   84    555  122  1,377  131   4,376  155   4,979 
Daiichi    64    436   97  1,346  129   3,800  133   3,635 
Iino   52    558   55  1,119   58   2,447   74   2,564 
 
 Notes:  For reasons of data availability, the 1964 data in Panel B reflect 
mid-year data rather than end of year data as elsewhere,. 
 
 
C.  Debt (Long-term, Short-term; in million yen;): 
 
      1964      1968      1973      1978    . 
Sanko   3,247   1,594  19,719   7,282  109,368 43,820  183,628  64,156 
NYK  31,114 10,661 92,241 13,660 175,963  49,604 119,104  118,281 
Mitsui OSK  34,767 23,521 71,864 11,527 143,881  50,511 102,509    90,938 
Japan Lines  21,078  9,661  56,779   9,332  106,810 26,581   58,494  56,238 
Kawasaki  27,244 14,260 67,898 10,064   91,300  25,737   97,830    41,901 
Yamashita  15,605  16,671  47,173   6,412   70,024 18,682   43,793  26,549 
Showa   9,458   9,379  31,238   3,077   59,726  9,346   45,255  19,729 
Shinwa   8,936   3,078  17,397   2,096   32,277  5,207   23,916  11,088 
Daiichi   1,264   2,223  18,790   1,204   30,590  4,613   19,079   9,298 
Iino   7,307   8,178   1,659   1,360   20,349  3,551   23,219   8,331 Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 27 
Table 8 (Continued) 
 
 
D.  Composition of Bank Debt (% JDB, Name of and % Borrowed from Other 
    Principal Creditor): 
 
    1965      1970      1975    . 
Sanko   0   Dw  34  0  LTCB  13   0  LTCB   9 
NYK  73   Mb   5  76  IBJ  4  59    Mb  10 
Mitsui OSK  65   NA    75  IBJ  5  61   IBJ   6 
Japan Lines  66  IBJ   9  77  IBJ  5  53    **   7 
Kawasaki  65   NA    67 NA    61   IBJ    8 
Yamashita  68   Sw  11  78  IBJ  4  68    Sw   7 
Showa  61 IBJ    8  77 LTCB  6  67 LTCB    7 
Shinwa  58 IBJ  17  77 IBJ  8  74   IBJ    8 
Daiichi  57 Smt  16  80 IBJ  5  76   IBJ    5 
Iino  45    *  19  80  IBJ  5  70   IBJ   7 
 
Notes:  Dw:  Daiwa; Mb: Mitsubishi Bank; NA:  information not available; IBJ:  
Industrial Bank of Japan; Sw:  Sanwa Bank; Smt:  Sumitomo Bank; LTCB:  Long-term 
Credit Bank; * Kawasaki Shipbuilding; ** Bank of America. 
 
  
E.  Annual Shareholder Rate of Return: 
 
  1955-60 1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 
Sanko   6.1   10.5  32.0  61.5 
NYK   1.8    7.5  11.9  25.1 
Mitsui OSK  -0.9    4.5   8.6  25.9 
Japan Lines   8.6    5.3   9.4  49.6 
Kawasaki   3.5   10.5  12.4  27.4 
Yamashita   5.4   -3.5  12.9  33.9 
Showa   5.2    0.6  16.6  31.9 
Shinwa -2.6    -2.7  13.8  38.9 
Daiichi  N.A.   N.A.   6.9  17.8 




 Sources:  Nihon shoken keizai kenkyu jo, ed., Kabushiki 
toshi shueki ritsu [Rates of Return on Common Stock] (Tokyo:  
Nihon shoken keizai kenkyu jo, various years). 
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C.  Tanker Firms: 
Nonconformity neither started nor stopped with idiosyncratic Sanko.  Sanko may 
have been the most visible shipping firm to buck national shipping policy, but it was 
hardly alone.  If it questioned the government's unwillingness to promote tankers, so did 
many petroleum refining firms.  Rather than defer to national policy, some bought their 
own tankers or formed transportation subsidiaries that did.
17   
Through such policies, the refining firms integrated vertically into transporation.  
Sometimes, they bought the tankers in conjunction with foreign firms.  These foreign 
firms could borrow abroad, of course.  Arbitrage being what it is, Japanese firms that 
entered joint ventures with them could finance both their refineries and tankers abroad.   
Take Tokyo tankaa (Tokyo Tanker), the first of the specialized tanker firms 
(Nihon sekiyu, 1982).  The Nisseki refining firm had formed a joint venture with Caltex 
in 1951.  That joint venture (it bought a 64 percent interest) then teamed up with Nisseki 
(4 percent) and Koa Petroleum (32 percent) to form Tokyo Tanker in 1952.  Initially, 
Tokyo Tanker leased a ship from the joint venture itself.  By 1956, it began building its 
own fleet.  For its first vessel, it borrowed $4 million from the First National City Bank 
of New York.  It borrowed another $5 million from First National in 1958, and $5 million 
from Chase Manhattan in 1959.   
Internationally, vertically integrated tanker operations were the norm (Okaniwa, 
1981: 125), and Nisseki had close ties to Caltex.  Yet within Japan even petroleum firms 
not tied to foreign firms borrowed abroad and bought their own tankers.  From 1955 to 
1963, the independent Idemitsu kosan firm borrowed $56 million from Bank of America 
and Esso ($6 million of that for tanker capacity).  Independent Maruzen sekiyu borrowed 
$61 million from the Bank of America, Unoco, and Continental Illinois (also $6 million 
for tankers).  And independent Daikyo sekiyu, Nihon kogyo, and Shin Ajia sekiyu each 
borrowed lesser amounts abroad (Sangyo keikaku, 1965: 71-73).  Indeed, from 1960 to 
1963, only 16 of the 41 tankers built were funded by the government, and 11 were funded 
abroad (Tonen, 1979: 315).   
The petroleum refining firms built considerable transportation capacity.  By 1978, 
Tokyo Tanker had 8 tankers carrying 749 thousand tons.  Idemitsu (with its own tanker 
subsidiary) owned 10 tankers (1,200 thousand tons), Daikyo (also with a tanker 
subsidiary) owned 3 (189 thousand ton), and Maruzen 2 (46 thousand ton).  The firm 
with the most tanker capacity, however, remained the Sanko shipping firm:  23 tankers 
carrying 2.6 million tons (Nihon tankaa, 1980:  220-21). 
In Table 9, we detail the shipping capacity firms developed outside government 
policy.  Of all new ships in 1965, they produced 36 percent (18 percent of total capacity) 
beyond the official programs.  Like Sanko, they apparently found no financing barriers 
they could not circumvent.  To fund these ships, they borrowed 15 percent from banks, 
41 percent from trading partners (such as shipbuilding firms), and 26 percent abroad 
(Nihon senshu, 1970:  172-73; Ginko kyokai, 1965: 361).   
 
D.  The Oil Embargo: 
                     
17 Refineries affiliated with foreign firms used tanker subsidiaries because Japanese law prohibited 
the ownership of Japanese flag vessels by firms with foreign national directors.  See Senpaku ho [Ship 
Act], Law No. 46 of 1899, § 1. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 29 
  Come OPEC, all this changed.  Facing radically higher oil prices, western firms 
now cut the amount of oil they consumed -- and, hence, shipped.  They also began 
looking harder for oil outside of the Middle East -- and further cut the amount they 
shipped.  Firms that had invested heavily in tankers suffered, and Sanko as much as any.  
By 1985, it filed for bankruptcy.  Ex post, it had gambled and lost.  Gambles that go bad 
ex post can still be good ex ante, of course.  At least investors seem to have thought 
Sanko a good gamble ex ante.  And in losing ex post, Sanko was also in good company.  
Even the government-favored firms lost heavily.  Among the government's annointed six, 
Japan Lines had failed and been acquired by Yamashita by 1988. 
Good or bad ex ante, Sanko's gamble was one in which it had been able to 
indulge.  It was not a gamble the capital market stopped.  Neither was it a gamble the 
government prevented.  Competitive capital markets will usually route entrepreneurs the 
funds they need for sensible gambles.  Often, they will route them the funds for foolish 
gambles too.  Sensible or foolish, Sanko's gamble was one the market funded amply 
indeed.  
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Table 9:  Government Approved and Independently 




        Government approved ships  Indep ships   
 Production Financing   Production  
 No  Cap  Gov  PB  Eq  No    Cap      Gov/Tot 
 
1961  27    498  .54 .56   0   42    581    .46 
1962  13    393  .71 .29   0   15    209    .65 
1963  18    567  .77 .23   0   15    170    .77 
1964  41  1,209  .78 .22   0   32    424    .74 
1965  65  1,825  .77 .23   0   36    405    .82 
 
1966  75  1,909  .76 .24   0    69    483    .80 
1967  56  2,033  .76 .24   0   72    809    .72 
1968  57  2,308  .77 .23   0  128    841    .73 
1969 57  2,747  .62  .28  .10  161  1,191    .70 
1970 45  2,624  .61  .30  .09  118  1,162    .69 
 
1971 41  3,218  .53  .30  .17  192  3,706    .46 
1972 37  3,304  .52  .30  .18  115  1,307    .72 
1973 25  1,985  .49  .32  .19  115  4,396    .31 
 
 
 Notes:  No:  Number of ships built.  Cap:  capacity of 
ships built, in 1000 tons.  Gov:  fraction of shipbuilding 
costs funded by government loans.  PB:  fraction of 
shipbuilding costs funded by loans from private banks.  Eq:  
fraction of shipbuilding costs funded out of shipping firm 
equity.  Gov/Tot:  total capacity of ships produced with 
government approval, divided by total capacity of all ships 
produced.  Slightly different figures for independently 
produced ships appear in Nihon zosen (1980:  139 tab. 1).   
 
 Sources:  Nihon senshu kyokai, ed., Kaiun tokei yoran 
[Survey of Ocean Shipping Statistics] (Tokyo:  Nihon senshu 
kyokai), pp. 172-73 (1970 ed.), pp. 284-85 (1981 ed.); Nihon 
zosen kogyo kai, ed., Nihon zosen kogyo kai 30 nen shi [A 30-
Year History of the Japan Shipbuilding Industry Association] 
(Tokyo:  Nihon zosen kogyo kai, 1980), p. 391; Ginko kyokai, 
ed., Ginko kyokai 20-nen shi [A 20-Year History of the Banking 
Association] (Tokyo:  Ginko kyokai, 1965), p. 361;  Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 31 
V.  Conclusions: 
  By most accounts, in the 1960s and 70s the Japanese government banned 
foreigners from investing in Japan.  It closed domestic competitors to bank loans.  It 
capped loan interest rates.  Thereupon, it rationed credit to its favored firms. 
  In fact, the government did nothing of the sort.  It did not stop foreign investors, 
did not shut down domestic competitors, and did not relevantly cap loan interest rates.  It 
did not ration credit, for the credit market cleared.  Because banks could set nominal 
interest rates at market levels, for large firms they did not use “compensating deposits” to 
hike effective rates. 
  The Japanese story of the 1960s and 70s is not a story about a government that 
directed credit to promote industrial policy.  It is a story about decentralized financial 
markets that allocated funds competitively.  Although the government did claim to 
regulate access to credit, like most other governments at most times it lacked the means 
to do so.  For ultimately, such is the nature of money:  fungible, durable, readily 
concealable, and widely available.  Because it is all that, money is also easily tradeable 
and effectively arbritrable.  Faced with government controls that did not bind, Japanese 
firms raised their funds in markets that cleared.  Faced with controls that did not bind, 
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